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Abstract 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have become increasingly popular as a means of 
encouraging FDI from developed to developing countries. We adopt a matched difference-in-
difference estimation to deal with the problem of endogeneity when estimating the effects of 
BITs on inward FDI. Our results indicate that forming a BIT with a developed country 
approximately doubles FDI inflows and stocks to developing countries on average, with a 
significant part of this arising from the development of new FDI relationships. The effects of 
BIT formation on FDI tend to increase with the size and similarity of the host and source 
economies and BITs may be complementary to institutional quality in the host country.   
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1. Introduction 
The last 30 years have seen a proliferation of international bilateral or plurilateral agreements 
covering the flows of trade, investment and people. While the scope of Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs) tends to be the widest, with currently around 300 PTAs in force and each 
PTA having an average of around 12 members (see WTO, 2011), Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) have also increased in popularity. At the end of the 1960s there were only 75 BITs in 
force. This increased to 167 by the end of the 1970s, and 389 by the end of the 1980s. Today 
there are 2,807 BITs in existence, with 2,103 in force.1 Investment agreements have become an 
important policy tool with many proposed PTAs considering the inclusion of an investment 
chapter (e.g. the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), EU-Canada, EU-
India). Understanding their impact both on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and on 
economic performance more generally is therefore an important issue. 
The aim of BITs is to encourage the flows of FDI from generally high-income suppliers to 
lower-income recipients. FDI is expected to benefit host countries through a number of 
channels. In addition to the inflow of capital, FDI is often accompanied by the movement of 
firm-specific assets such as technology, managerial ability, corporate governance and access to 
networks connecting foreign markets. FDI is also expected to encourage competition among 
domestic firms, and hopefully therefore increase efficiency. Spillovers from FDI may also be 
expected through the leakage of proprietary knowledge (see Görg and Greenaway, 2004, for a 
review of the evidence on spillovers from FDI). These potential gains from FDI lie behind the 
decision of policymakers in developing countries to sign BITs, despite such agreements 
impinging on their national sovereignty (Elkins et. al. 2004; Guzman, 1998; and Neumayer, 
2005).  
                                                            
1 http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA, accessed on 16 October 2014.  
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The benefits from signing BITs for the source countries – and source country firms in particular 
– arise because BITs guarantee certain levels of treatment for foreign investors. These include 
most-favoured country treatment, fair and equitable treatment for foreign investors, and the free 
transfer and repatriation of capital and profits (Dolzer and Stevens, 1995; UNCTAD, 1998). 
Most controversially, BIT parties agree to be bound by dispute settlement provisions that are 
intended to ensure basic requirements of credible protection of property and contract rights, but 
which often result in foreign investors being granted greater security and better treatment than 
domestic investors (Vandevelde, 1998).2 The investor settlement procedure potentially involves 
considerable interference in domestic policy, with practically any public policy being subject to 
challenge.3 For individual hosts there are likely to be benefits from being able to provide credible 
commitments to investors, which can lead to a competitive advantage as long as not all potential 
hosts have signed such treaties. The costs of BITs can generally be justified if the outcome of the 
BIT is to increase FDI inflows, and if these FDI inflows provide the benefits discussed above. 
The extent to which BITs actually encourage inward FDI is an empirical question. Despite their 
recent proliferation, there remains relatively little empirical research addressing the impact of 
BITs on FDI flows (or stocks).4  What work there is generally adopts one of two approaches. 
Some studies explain bilateral flows (or stocks) of FDI, usually estimating a gravity-type equation 
and including as one of its arguments a dummy variable for country-pairs that have a BIT. 
Others move away from a bilateral focus and examine whether countries that sign BITs see an 
increase in aggregate FDI inflows. While, in principle, BITs only protect investors from the 
signatory states to whom binding commitments have been made, their existence may also signal 
                                                            
2 Through this mechanism foreign investors can avoid national legal systems, opting instead for international 
arbitration, where they can choose one of the three panellists, and where consensus is required for one of the other 
two (Elkins et al, 2004). Recently there has been a strong increase in the number of arbitration cases (Bellack, 2013) 
and the presence of international arbitrage clauses has caused concern amongst citizens in the EU regarding the 
proposed TTIP agreement. 
3 Evidence of this is the use of investor-state dispute settlement provisions by Tobacco companies in response to 
cigarette packaging laws.  
4 The literature studying the effects of these international agreements tends to be skewed towards studies of PTAs. 
Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) in their meta-analysis of PTAs include 85 studies, whereas Bellack (2013) in his more 
recent meta-analysis of the effects of BITs includes estimates from just 33 studies. 
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to potential investors elsewhere that this host country protects the interests of foreign investors 
more generally. If this is the case, then BITs encourage FDI inflows from both BIT partners and 
non-BIT sources.5  
An example of the bilateral approach is Hallward-Driemeier (2003), who considers bilateral FDI 
flows from 20 OECD countries to 31 developing countries over the period 1980-2000. 
Controlling for country size and other country-specific factors, she finds no direct evidence that 
the existence of a BIT between a developed and a developing country increases the flow of FDI 
to the latter. If interactions between the BIT dummy and measures of institutional quality are 
included however, the estimated coefficients are positive and often significant, a result implying 
that BITs are complementary to institutional quality. Perhaps BITs might seem credible in an 
environment of good institutional quality? Alternatively, as noted earlier, BITs might substitute 
for host institutional quality by providing a certain standard of treatment to foreign investors 
where domestic institutions fail to do so.6  
An example of the aggregate approach is Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) who examine five 
year averages of aggregate FDI inflows for 63 countries over the period 1980 to 2000. They find 
that a higher number of BITs (either in total or signed with a high income country) lowers the 
share of global FDI a high-risk country receives, but raises the FDI share for low risk countries, 
results consistent with a complementary relationship between BITs and institutional quality. 
Neumayer and Spess (2005) follow a similar approach, using aggregate FDI inflows to individual 
developing countries as their dependent variable. This variable is related to the cumulative 
number of BITs signed with developed countries (weighted by their share in total OECD FDI) 
and other explanatory variables. Their results indicate that a higher number of BITs raises FDI 
to developing countries, a result that is robust to changes in model specification, estimation 
                                                            
5 Studies following both approaches generally neglect the potential for FDI diversion however, which arises when 
investors from a BIT signatory are encouraged to invest in the BIT partner at the expense of other non-BIT hosts. 
6 Related to the notion of heterogeneous effects of BITs, Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) also use bilateral FDI data 
and find that signing a BIT with the US is associated with significantly higher FDI inflows, but that signing a BIT 
with another OECD country has an insignificant impact of FDI inflows. 
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technique and sample size. The authors also report some evidence suggesting that BITs might 
act as substitutes for good domestic institutional quality, though this result is not robust to 
alternative specifications of institutional quality.  
Whatever the approach adopted, the evidence from this literature, while broadly supportive of a 
positive effect of BITs on FDI inflows, is far from conclusive on its magnitude. In his meta-
analysis, Bellack (2013) reports that 11% of the estimated coefficients on the BIT dummy are 
actually negative (2% being significantly so), with 76% of the coefficients being positive and 
significant. In addition, he finds that more recent studies have been more likely to find a negative 
coefficient and that the dispersion of the estimated coefficients has tended to increase over time. 
Bellack (2013) reports an un-weighted mean semi-elasticity of 17.6 percent in the papers he 
considers, but the standard deviation is found to be 37.4 with some estimates above 100% and 
others below -50%.  
One issue that has been largely ignored in this literature is the potential endogeneity of the BITs 
themselves. The majority of existing studies treat BIT formation as exogenous, with country-
pairs being implicitly assumed to be randomly assigned into BITs, rather than self-selecting into 
them. Recent work by Bergstrand and Egger (2013) has shown that the economic fundamentals 
often found to determine FDI flows are also determinants of BIT membership. This can lead to 
a self-selection bias in the estimated impact of BITs on FDI flows. Some existing studies do 
attempt to control for this endogeneity, with Aisbett (2009), for example, using country-pair 
fixed effects in a model of bilateral FDI to control for self-selection and finding that their 
inclusion reduces the coefficient on the BIT dummy and renders it insignificant. In contrast 
Busse et al (2010) use an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach to control for endogeneity and 
still find a positive and significant impact of BITs on FDI inflows.  
This paper extends this literature by using a different methodology to existing studies that allows 
us to control for potential endogeneity of BIT membership. Specifically, we employ a matched 
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difference-in-difference approach to identify a causal effect of BIT formation on bilateral FDI 
flows and stocks. By matching we look to reduce the differences in the outcome variable (i.e. 
FDI flows or stocks) between treated (i.e. new BIT country-pairs) and non-treated (i.e. non-BIT 
country-pairs) observations by conditioning on a set of observable variables. The difference-in-
difference approach allows us to control for time-invariant unobserved effects. Combining the 
two approaches controls for both observed and unobserved differences between BIT members 
and non-members, and potentially provides strong evidence of the causal effects of BIT 
membership on FDI flows and stocks. In our analysis, we also distinguish between the impact of 
BITs on existing FDI relationships between countries (i.e. the intensive margin) and their impact 
in creating new FDI relationships (i.e. the extensive margin). We find that BIT membership has a 
large positive and significant impact on FDI flows and stocks, with the development of new FDI 
relationships being an important source of these increases. We further find evidence to suggest 
that the effect of BIT formation is heterogeneous, with market size and similarity and possibly 
other factors, impacting upon the relationship between BIT formation and FDI flows and 
stocks. 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows: Section 2 describes our data; Section 3 presents 
gravity estimates for FDI levels and Probit estimates for BIT formation; Section 4 describes the 
matching results; Section 5 looks at heterogeneous matching effects; and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Data  
Flows of FDI have grown more rapidly than trade for much of the last three decades. FDI 
inflows were around $400 million in 1995, $1.4 trillion in 2000 and, following slumps in the early 
2000s and the recent global crisis, rose to $1.45 trillion in 2013 (World Investment Report, 
2014). In our analysis we use the OECD’s International Investment Statistics, which report data 
on bilateral FDI stocks (inward and outward stocks) and flows (inflows and outflows) for 
OECD reporting countries and a much larger sample of partner countries from 1982 onwards. 
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Specifically, we use data on FDI flows and stocks (measured in thousands of US dollars) from 22 
OECD reporting countries (the ‘North’) to up to 118 other countries7 (the ‘South’). Since we use 
data on the five years prior to and subsequent to a particular year in the difference-in-difference 
analysis, we are restricted to the years 1990-2006 for our regression analysis.8 
Recently, Bergstrand and Egger (2013) developed an econometric model that simultaneously 
explained the “economic” determinants of BITs and PTAs. In our analysis we include a similar 
set of variables, such that the basic specification of the Probit model of selection into a BIT can 
be written as: 
ܤܫ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൌ ߙ௜௝ ൅ ߚଵ ln൫ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ܩܦ ௝ܲ௧൯ ൅ ߚଶܩܦܲݏ݅݉௜௝௧ ൅ ߚଷ lnܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝ ൅ ߚସܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝ ൅
ߚହܥ݋݈݉ܽ݊ ௜݃௝ ൅ ߚ଺ܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௜௝ ൅ ߚ଻ ௄೔೟൫௄೔೟ା௄ೕ೟൯ ൅ ߚ଼ܲܶܣ௜௝௧ ൅ ߚଽܱܲܮܥܱ ௝ܰ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧ (1) 
where (i) ܤܫ ௜ܶ௝௧ is a dummy variable that takes the value one if reporter ݅ and partner ݆ have a 
BIT in force in year ݐ. Our information source is UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub 
(http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA); (ii) ln൫ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ܩܦ ௝ܲ௧൯ is a measure of bilateral 
economic size; (iii) ܩܦܲݏ݅݉௜௝௧ ≡ lnሾݏ݄௜௧ሺ1 െ ݏ݄௜௧ሻሿ, where ݏ݄௜ is the share of country ݅’s GDP 
in the total GDP of country-pair ݅ and ݆, is a measure of similarity in bilateral economic size;  (iv) 
ܭ௜௧/൫ܭ௜௧ ൅ ܭ௝௧൯ is the share of the source country capital in their combined capital stocks, and 
gives a measure of relative factor endowments. The capital stock is calculated using data on gross 
capital formation and the perpetual inventory method assuming a depreciation rate of 13%. Data 
on GDP and gross capital formation are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators; 
(v)	ܥ݋݊ݐ݅ ௜݃௝ , ܥ݋݈݉ܽ݊ ௜݃௝ and ܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௜௝ are dummy variables taking the value one if the two 
countries share a border, a language or had a colonial relationship; (vi) ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝ is the great circle 
distance between the two countries’ capital cities. Data on gravity determinants are from CEPII; 
                                                            
7 The full sets of reporter and recipient countries included in the analysis are listed in the Appendix. 
8 The average number of new BITs per year between 1990 and 2006 was 46, with a minimum of 13 in 2005 and a 
maximum of 66 in 1999. 
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(vii)  ܲܶܣ௜௝௧ is a dummy variable taking the value one if the source and host are in the same PTA 
at time ݐ. Data on PTAs is taken from the Global Preferential Trade Agreements Database 
(http://wits.worldbank.org/gptad/)); and (viii) 	ܱܲܮܥܱ ௝ܰ௧ is an index which measures the 
extent to which political actors in the host country are constrained in their choice of future 
policies by the existence of other political actors with veto power. This index was developed by 
Henisz (2000) and has recently been updated to 2011.9 It ranges between zero (the executive has 
complete discretion and can change policies at any time) and one (a change of existing policies is 
infeasible)10 and is an indicator of the ability of political institutions to make credible 
commitments to an existing policy regime. It is argued by both Henisz (2000) and Neumayer and 
Spess (2005) to be the political variable most relevant to potential investors.  
In addition to these variables,11 we report results including time-specific dummy variables and 
using the random effects panel Probit model to account for country-pair fixed effects (ߙ௜௝). In 
further specifications we also control for interdependence amongst countries. Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) have shown that trade between two countries is decreasing in their bilateral 
trade costs relative to the corresponding average with all their partners, rather than to absolute 
trade barriers. This they referred to as multilateral resistance. Paniagua (2011) derives a theory- 
based gravity model for FDI flows and also obtains multilateral resistance terms, implying that 
third country variables can impact upon the flows and stocks of FDI between two countries, as 
well as upon the probability that they sign a BIT. One way of capturing these multilateral 
resistance terms is through the inclusion of (time-varying) reporter and partner fixed effects,12 
                                                            
9 Data can be downloaded from http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/ (accessed 16th October 
2014) 
10 As a robustness check we use an indicator of the extent of checks and balances on the executive from Beck et al 
(2001), which has been updated to 2012. Results using this alternative indicator of political stability are available 
upon request, and are consistent with those reported here. 
11 Descriptive statistics for our explanatory variables are given in Table 3 below. 
12 Since the multilateral resistance terms are found to be importer and exporter specific they are often captured by 
importer and exporter specific fixed effects. In a time-varying panel setting the possibility that the multilateral 
resistance terms are time-varying also arises. In this case, importer-time and exporter-time fixed effects can be used 
to capture the time-varying nature of the multilateral resistance terms. 
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but these require estimation of a large number of additional coefficients, and time-varying country-
specific variables cannot be included alongside these fixed effects. Since this can be a significant 
drawback, we adopt the alternative approach of Baier and Bergstrand (2009b), who suggest 
controlling for multilateral resistance by including GDP-weighted distance, common language, 
common border and PTA variables as multilateral resistance controls.  
One issue with the FDI data that requires discussion is the presence of a large number of zero 
flows and stocks, as well as some negative values of FDI flows, which involve instances of 
reverse or dis-investment.13 Following the majority of the literature using the gravity equation we 
include our FDI measures in logs, which has the advantage of reducing the skewness of the 
distribution. Since we cannot take the log of zero or a negative number, these observations 
would be excluded from our analysis, which can lead to a sample selection bias. In our 
difference-in-difference analysis, where we use the difference in the log of the average values of 
FDI between two time periods, we have the further issue that all cases in which FDI was zero 
prior to signing a BIT will be ignored, thus excluding all observations in which FDI changed 
from zero (or a negative value) to some positive number following the formation of a BIT. To 
get around this issue, we follow the standard approach, also adopted by Neumayer and Spess 
(2005), of giving negative and zero FDI flows and stocks a logged value of zero (which is 
equivalent to setting the value of FDI to $1,000, since the FDI data are measured in thousands 
of US dollars).14 We are then able to include observations for which FDI changed from zero to 
                                                            
13 There are also a small number of negative values for FDI stocks. The OECD writes that these can arise since the 
“changes in FDI positions are affected by the accumulated flows and hence may also result in negative values, but 
mainly for other capital (e.g. when the loans from the direct investment enterprise to the parent exceed the loans – 
or even the original capital – given by the parent to the direct investment enterprise. It could be the case where 
conduits or treasury companies are involved)”.  
(source: www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/fdistatisticsanddata-frequentlyaskedquestions.htm). 
14 In the literature on the gravity equation attempts have recently been made to deal with a form of endogeneity that 
arises due to the presence of zero trade flows. Helpman et al (2008) for example propose a modified Heckman 
selection type model, while Santos and Tenreyro (2006) suggest using a Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood 
model. Neither of these approaches is possible in our (matched) difference-in-difference framework however. In the 
latter case, this is because the changes in FDI can be negative, which is not allowed in the Poisson regression model. 
In the former case, negative values are allowed, which implies that values of the changes in FDI are no longer 
censored at zero as would be the case when using the level of (rather than the change in) FDI, further implying that 
there is no natural cut-off value for the selection equation. 
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some positive number (and vice versa), and so we are able to include observations for which BIT 
formation led to the birth of a new FDI relationship (or even the death of a previous one). In 
other words, this transformation allows us to capture the effect of BIT formation on both the 
intensive (i.e. the increase in the intensity of already existing FDI relationships) and the extensive 
(i.e. the formation of new FDI relationships) margins of FDI.15  
3. Gravity and Probit Results 
We begin by using annual data to estimate a standard gravity equation explaining the level of FDI 
flows or stocks using the variables listed in equation (1) plus the BIT dummy. This allows for a 
comparison with earlier work and with the matched difference-in-difference results that follow. 
The results reported in Table 1 are largely as expected. FDI flows are positively associated with 
the sum of the combined size of the source and host economies and negatively associated with 
the distance between them. The coefficient on distance is somewhat lower (in absolute value) 
than that found in studies of trade (where a value of around -1.0 is often reported). Bergstrand 
and Egger (2013) argue that this could arise because trade costs (in this case costs associated with 
distance) would negatively impact upon vertical FDI, which seeks export platforms, but 
positively impact upon horizontal FDI, which seeks to ‘jump-over’ trade barriers. A common 
border, a former colonial relationship, a common language, and the presence of a PTA between 
the two countries are all associated with increased FDI flows. The outcomes for the other 
variables are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of country-pair fixed effects. The estimated 
coefficient on GDP similarity switches from positive and significant to negative and significant 
once these effects are included. Likewise for the political constraints variable, though the 
coefficients are not significant when country-pair fixed effects are included. Of most interest 
                                                            
15 It should be kept in mind that when we are considering differences in five-year averages, there is the possibility 
that a bilateral-pair are classed as being in a new FDI relationship in cases where an FDI relationship did already 
exist, but not in the five-years prior to the year of interest. Indeed there are 1,922 observations where average flows 
were zero but average stocks were positive. The extensive margin therefore captures the formation of new FDI 
relationships as well as the renewal of old FDI relationships therefore. 
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here however, are the coefficients on the BIT dummy. These are consistently positive and 
significant, with the coefficient ranging from 0.873 to 1.415, and tending to decline as additional 
fixed effects and MR controls are added. These estimates imply that the presence of a BIT is 
associated with an increase in bilateral FDI flows of between 139% and 312%.16 While large 
these estimates are not out of line with those in Bellack (2013), where a number of estimates 
around 300% are reported.17  
The results on FDI stocks are very similar to those for FDI flows. Again some estimates are 
sensitive to the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects. Specifically, the sum of GDPs, GDP 
similarity and the capital-share variable (which is now significant) switch from positive and 
significant to negative and significant,  as country-pair fixed effects are included. The coefficients 
on the BIT dummy are again positive and significant, implying an increase in FDI stocks of 
between 238% and 419%. Overall, these results provide strong support for a relatively large 
positive (linear) impact of BITs on North-South FDI flows and stocks using the traditional 
gravity approach. 
  
                                                            
16 Calculated as 100ሺexpሺߚሻ െ 1ሻ, where ߚ is the estimated coefficient on the BIT dummy. 
17 It should also be borne in mind that including the zero flows/stocks, albeit with an imposed value of $1,000, 
reduces the mean value of FDI flows/stocks considerably. In the case of FDI flows for example, the mean FDI 
flow (stock) is US$43.9 million (US$344 million) when the zeros are included and US$120.3 million (US$967 
million) when the zeros are excluded. Indeed, when estimating the gravity equation on the subset of positive FDI 
flows (stocks), we obtain estimated increases in FDI flows (stocks) of BIT membership between 47-68% (8-36%). 
The choice of including or excluding the zero flows (stocks) may help to explain the wide variety of estimates found 
in the literature therefore.  
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Table 1: Gravity Model of North-South FDI Flows and Stocks 
 FDI Flows FDI Stocks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
ܤܫܶ 1.415*** 1.282*** 1.150*** 0.885*** 0.873*** 1.647*** 1.365*** 1.427*** 1.235*** 1.220*** 
 (0.121) (0.123) (0.123) (0.113) (0.113) (0.159) (0.162) (0.162) (0.157) (0.157) 
ln൫ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ܩܦ ௝ܲ௧൯  1.582*** 1.555*** 1.562*** 0.539 0.856** 2.371*** 2.333*** 2.252*** -2.306*** -2.217*** 
 (0.0656) (0.0664) (0.0657) (0.358) (0.366) (0.0778) (0.0785) (0.0760) (0.547) (0.558) 
ܩܦܲݏ݅݉௜௝௧  0.936*** 0.927*** 0.907*** -0.246** -0.223** 1.316*** 1.312*** 1.317*** -0.848*** -0.842*** 
 (0.0486) (0.0492) (0.0486) (0.100) (0.100) (0.0622) (0.0628) (0.0616) (0.183) (0.184) 
lnܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝  -0.348*** -0.412*** -0.324***   -0.417*** -0.533*** -0.577***   
 (0.0751) (0.0758) (0.0821)   (0.100) (0.101) (0.108)   
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝  2.765*** 2.715*** 2.711***   3.354*** 3.263*** 2.396***   
 (0.850) (0.867) (0.883)   (0.817) (0.820) (0.815)   
ܥ݋݈݉ܽ݊݃௜௝  0.234 0.221 0.745***   0.695*** 0.678*** 0.853***   
 (0.152) (0.151) (0.165)   (0.201) (0.201) (0.216)   
ܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௜௝  1.794*** 1.876*** 1.807***   1.586*** 1.743*** 2.279***   
 (0.323) (0.322) (0.310)   (0.462) (0.456) (0.424)   
ܭ௜௧/൫ܭ௜௧ ൅ ܭ௝௧൯  0.187 0.0701 0.0368 -1.044 -0.372 1.318*** 1.119*** 1.293*** -7.361*** -7.157*** 
 (0.311) (0.314) (0.308) (1.075) (1.083) (0.415) (0.419) (0.406) (1.647) (1.657) 
ܱܲܮܥܱ ௝ܰ௧ 0.328* 0.401** 0.416** -0.121 -0.1000 0.505* 0.609** 0.601** -0.0922 -0.0912 
  (0.191) (0.195) (0.193) (0.158) (0.158) (0.261) (0.265) (0.260) (0.204) (0.204) 
ܲܶܣ௜௝௧  0.952*** 0.766*** 0.802*** 0.755*** 0.620*** 1.012*** 0.677*** 1.020*** 0.942*** 0.790*** 
 (0.164) (0.166) (0.163) (0.144) (0.149) (0.214) (0.214) (0.203) (0.195) (0.201) 
           
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MR Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Country-Pair FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
           
Observations 47,317 47,317 47,317 47,317 47,317 47,317 47,317 47,317 47,317 47,317 
R-squared 0.315 0.324 0.331 0.093 0.096 0.370 0.386 0.398 0.177 0.178 
F-Stat 217.1*** 90.32*** 84.39*** 41.96*** 38.14*** 236.7*** 102.3*** 97.92*** 54.66*** 48.15*** 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; MR controls refer to the set of GDP-weighted distance and other  
explanatory variables that are used to control for the multilateral resistance terms. 
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We now estimate a Probit model of BIT membership, using the same explanatory variables, to 
confirm that many of the factors that contribute to larger FDI flows also make BIT 
arrangements more likely. This provides a comparison with Bergstrand and Egger (2013), and 
allows us to assess the performance of our selection variables in the matching analysis that 
follows. Table 2 presents results from a simple Probit model of BIT membership estimated on 
the full sample using annual data for the period 1990-2011. In the final three specifications we 
account for the panel structure of the data through the use of a random effects Probit model.  
With few exceptions, the results are similar across the different specifications and also 
correspond quite closely with those in the equivalent FDI equations (i.e. those excluding 
country-pair fixed effects) in terms of the sign and significance of the coefficients on both FDI 
stocks and flows. They are broadly consistent with those of Bergstrand and Egger (2013).18 
Large, similar sized and closer economies tend to have more FDI so that the benefits of a BIT 
between them are larger. The colony variable is positive and significant, consistent with the view 
that FDI flows between countries sharing common institutions are larger, as are the benefits of a 
BIT agreement. The measure of differences in capital stocks between country-pairs is 
insignificant for FDI flows, positive and significant for FDI stocks and negative and significant 
for the probability of BIT formation. This suggests that a wider difference in capital stocks 
(endowments) between country-pairs may encourage FDI but lowers the benefits of BITs. 
Lower levels of discretion of the executive (i.e. more political checks) are associated with higher 
levels of FDI and a higher probability of two countries being BIT partners. Finally, being in a 
trade agreement encourages FDI and makes it more likely that two countries will also have a 
BIT. In contrast, while common borders or a common language both tend to encourage FDI, a 
                                                            
18 Bergstrand and Egger (2013) conclude that the potential welfare gains from and likelihood of forming a BIT 
between a country-pair are higher: the larger and more similar in GDP are the country-pair; the closer in distance are 
the two countries; if the two countries are not adjacent and do not share a common language; and the higher the 
degrees of political stability and of expropriation risk of the pair. They further find some evidence to indicate that 
current PTAs positively impact upon BIT formation. 
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common border tends to reduce the probability of a BIT and a common language has no 
consistent effect. Bergstrand and Egger (2013) tend to find negative coefficients on these two 
variables in their BIT regression, arguing that they reduce trade costs and hence encourage trade 
rather than  horizontal FDI, which in turn lowers the probability of two countries entering a BIT 
agreement. Finally, Table 2 also reports information on the percentage of observations that are 
correctly predicted,19 which ranges from 73% to 77%. Although the percent of correct 
predictions for when a BIT is in place is somewhat lower (ranging between 24% and 54%), the 
results provide support for the notion that countries self-select into BITs based upon these 
observable variables.  
 
  
                                                            
19 An observation is said to be correctly predicted if the predicted probability is greater than or equal to 0.5 and the 
BIT dummy is equal to one, or if the predicted probability is less than 0.5 and the BIT dummy is equal to zero. 
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Table 2: Probit Model of Selection into BITs  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
ln൫ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ܩܦ ௝ܲ௧൯  0.413*** 0.402*** 0.466*** 6.560*** 3.123*** 3.202*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0269) (0.0281) (0.0368) (0.0838) (0.109) 
ܩܦܲݏ݅݉௜௝௧  0.230*** 0.232*** 0.214*** 3.608*** 2.148*** 1.948*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0228) (0.0233) (0.0456) (0.0667) (0.0872) 
lnܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝  -0.459*** -0.515*** -0.410*** -2.163*** -4.070*** -4.069*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0350) (0.0384) (0.0917) (0.139) (0.183) 
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝  -0.939*** -0.973*** -0.716** -9.419*** -1.498 -2.583*** 
 (0.326) (0.330) (0.304) (0.567) (1.652) (0.993) 
ܥ݋݈݉ܽ݊݃௜௝  -0.0213 -0.0206 0.368*** 2.075*** -1.617*** 0.866** 
 (0.0976) (0.101) (0.109) (0.211) (0.275) (0.357) 
ܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௜௝  0.697*** 0.766*** 0.561*** 1.791*** 7.820*** 8.608*** 
 (0.140) (0.146) (0.156) (0.356) (0.518) (0.521) 
ܭ௜௧/൫ܭ௜௧ ൅ ܭ௝௧൯  -0.349** -0.428*** -0.524*** 5.443*** -4.530*** -6.383*** 
 (0.151) (0.159) (0.155) (0.364) (0.579) (1.023) 
ܱܲܮܥܱ ௝ܰ௧  0.269*** 0.294*** 0.310*** 1.033*** 0.895*** 0.701** 
 (0.100) (0.106) (0.107) (0.124) (0.279) (0.313) 
ܲܶܣ௜௝௧  0.355*** 0.198*** 0.160** 2.924*** 1.769*** 1.184*** 
 (0.0652) (0.0672) (0.0712) (0.166) (0.214) (0.288) 
       
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
MR Controls No No Yes No No Yes 
Country-Pair FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 47,317 47,317 47,317 47,317 47,317 47,317 
log L -24,084 -23,163 -22,169 -6,230 -3,989 -4,040 
       
Percent correctly predicted       
ܤܫܶ ൌ 1  43.70 47.48 50.80 53.99 38.05 24.30 
ܤܫܶ ൌ 0  88.54 89.41 89.87 81.95 93.10 97.27 
Overall 74.28 76.07 76.76 73.06 75.59 74.06 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; MR controls refer to the set of 
GDP-weighted distance and other explanatory variables that are used to control for the multilateral resistance terms. 
 
4. Matched Difference-in-Difference Results 
We now move away from existing approaches and use matching techniques to identify the causal 
effect of BITs on FDI flows and stocks.20 21 Our general problem is to compare the change in the 
FDI variable (flow or stock) for countries that enter into a BIT at time ݐ with what it would have 
                                                            
20 Matching econometrics has been used in labour economics to identify the effect of treatment for some time, and 
has become increasingly popular in other areas of economics. In the trade literature for example, matching has been 
employed to consider the causal effect of exporting on firm productivity (see for example, Girma et al, 2003) and to 
examine the impact of PTAs on international trade (see Egger et al, 2008; Baier and Bergstrand, 2009a). 
21 There are alternative approaches. One is to use IV estimation, but this requires strong assumptions about 
functional form, and typically requires the existence of instruments that are correlated with the selection indicators 
but not directly with the outcome. A second alternative is to control for unobserved heterogeneity through the use 
of country-pair fixed effects (e.g. Aisbett, 2009). Such a method only gives unbiased estimates if new BIT 
membership is uncorrelated with the time-variant error, however. As mentioned by Aisbett (2009), the approach can 
also reduce the variability in the data, which can result in insignificant coefficients. 
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been in the absence of the BIT.  The problem is that the counterfactual is unobservable, and this 
is where matching can help. We can estimate the counterfactual, using the average value of the 
change in FDI for country-pairs that didn’t have a BIT at time ݐ. In order for this to be valid 
however, we require that any differences in the changes in the FDI variable between BIT 
members and the non-BIT control group (other than those due to the presence of the BIT) are 
eliminated. We thus require a suitable control group. The basic idea behind matching is to find 
for each treated individual in the sample (e.g. for each country pair entering into a BIT) an 
untreated individual (i.e. country pair not entering a BIT) with similar characteristics. We match 
on the characteristics listed in Table 2, under the assumption that once these characteristics have 
been controlled for, country pairs are effectively randomly assigned to the BIT and non-BIT 
groups.22 A comparison of the outcomes for the treated and the matched untreated groups then 
gives an estimate of the effect of the treatment.23  
It is generally impractical to match on many explanatory variables. Similarity is therefore defined 
according to some metric that maps the vector of observables into a univariate variable. Two 
approaches are often adopted. The first approach is called Mahalanobis matching, and involves 
weighting the coordinates of the covariates matrix by the inverse of that variable. The second is 
called propensity score weighting and involves constructing the probability of treatment using a 
Logit or Probit equation.24 For the latter approach, we use Probit specification 3 in Table 2, 
albeit considering the probability of new BIT formation only. This specification has the highest 
                                                            
22 This approach is often termed ‘selection on observables’ and relies upon the assumption of ignorability of 
treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
23 In particular, this gives an estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT, see below), which in our 
case gives the expected impact of new BIT membership on FDI flows (or stocks) for a randomly drawn country-
pair in the subsample of country-pairs that actually entered into a BIT agreement. Note that the ATT can be 
obtained from a weighted least squares regression, where the weights for the untreated observations correspond to 
the weights used in the construction of the control group. 
24 For more information on the difference between these estimators see Wooldridge (2010) and the Stata help file 
for psmatch2. Each method has strengths and weaknesses, and so we present results from both below. Wooldridge 
(2002) does note however that the Mahalanobis approach of matching on the full set of covariates can be 
computationally intensive. It has also been shown that a large number of covariates can lead to substantial bias (see 
Fröhlich, 2004). To overcome this problem, Abadie and Imbens (2006) suggest a bias correction that renders the 
matching estimator consistent. In the analysis below, we apply this bias correction when using the Mahalanobis 
estimator. 
17 
 
overall percent correctly predicted and reports relatively high values of the percent correctly 
predicted for both ܤܫܶ ൌ 0 and, more importantly, ܤܫܶ ൌ 1.25  
Using one of these two approaches, it is possible to match a treated individual to either one or 
multiple untreated individuals. In the analysis below for example, we report results when 
matching with a single nearest neighbour and when matching with the five nearest neighbours. 
In the case of propensity score matching we further report results from alternative weighting 
methods. In particular, we use radius matching and kernel density matching. In the former case a 
radius of 0.1 (i.e. ten percentage points of the likelihood of becoming a new BIT pair) is chosen, 
such that all country-pairs within that radius will be included in the control group. The latter case 
uses all untreated observations in the control group, with the weights attached to each untreated 
individual declining with the propensity score difference of the treated observation.  
Since the matching approach is only valid on a cross-section basis, we modify our cross-country 
time-series data using an approach similar to that of Egger et al (2008).26 This involves the 
following steps: 
1. For each year in our dataset, we calculate the log of the average of the FDI flow (or stock) 
from source ݅ to host ݆ in the five years prior to that year, (ln ܲܣܨܦܫ௜௝௧), as well as the logged 
average of FDI flows or stocks in the five years subsequent to our year of interest (ln ܵܣܨܦܫ௜௝௧). 
We further calculate the average over the previous five years of each of the continuous 
explanatory variables (ܲܣ ௜ܺ௝௧).  
2. We then drop all observations for which a BIT was already in force prior to year ݐ, ensuring 
that existing BITs will never be used in the comparison group in the matching procedure. 
                                                            
25 As a robustness check we repeat the matching analysis using specification 6, which has the highest overall 
percentage correctly predicted. These results are not reported for reasons of brevity, but are consistent with the 
results reported below and available upon request. 
26 An alternative approach is to ignore the time-series dimension and concentrate on a single cross-section, as 
adopted by Baier and Bergstrand (2009a) in their study of the trade effects of PTAs. 
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3. The difference in the FDI stocks and flows between the two time periods is then calculated 
for the remaining country-pairs: 
∆ lnܨܦܫ௜௝௧ ൌ ሺln ܵܣܨܦܫ௜௝௧ሻ െ ሺln ܲܣܨܦܫ௜௝௧ሻ 
By concentrating on five-year windows on either side of the date a BIT is entered into we are 
considering the contemporaneous (or short-run) impact of BITs on FDI flows and stocks. We 
can view our modified data as a cross-section of new BIT signing events (though we do control 
for differences in the change in FDI over time by including year fixed effects in the list of 
explanatory variables in various specifications). 
4. Using either Mahalanobis or propensity score matching, we match new BIT country-pairs to 
non-BIT country-pairs at time ݐ on the basis of the observable explanatory variables, ܲܣ ௜ܺ௝௧.  
5. We define ܰ݁ݓܤܫ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൌ 1 if ݅ and ݆ formed a BIT in period ݐ, and zero otherwise; and 
∆݈݊ܨܦܫ௜௝௧்  as the change in FDI if ݅ and ݆	are ‘treated’ (i.e. form a BIT) in year ݐ, and ∆݈݊ܨܦܫ௜௝௧௎  
as the change in FDI otherwise. We can then calculate the following: (i) the average treatment 
effect (ATE) defined as 
ܣܶܧ ൌ ܧሺ∆݈݊ܨܦܫ௜௝௧் െ ∆݈݊ܨܦܫ௜௝௧௎ ሻ 
which gives an estimate of the expected effect of treatment for a randomly drawn country pair 
from the population; (ii) the Average Treatment effect of the Treated (ATT) defined as  
ܣܶܶ ൌ ܧሺ∆݈݊ܨܦܫ௜௝௧் െ ∆݈݊ܨܦܫ௜௝௧௎ |ܰ݁ݓܤܫ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൌ 1ሻ 
which provides an estimate of the mean effect of treatment for those pairs which are actually 
treated; and (iii) the Average Treatment effect of the Untreated (ATU) defined as:  
ܣܷܶ ൌ ܧሺ∆݈݊ܨܦܫ௜௝௧் െ ∆݈݊ܨܦܫ௜௝௧௎ |ܰ݁ݓܤܫ ௜ܶ௝௧ ൌ 0ሻ 
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which gives the expected effect of hypothetical treatment for those pairs not treated.  
This approach of comparing the difference in FDI flows and stocks immediately prior to and 
after the formation of a BIT for both new BIT partners and a control group of non-BIT 
partners is termed the matched difference-in-difference estimator. In addition to controlling for 
observed heterogeneity between the BIT and non-BIT samples through the use of the matching 
procedure, the method also controls for unobserved heterogeneity through the use of the 
difference-in-difference procedure, thus potentially providing strong evidence of the causal 
effects of BITs on FDI.  
In our analysis, we use the information on whether FDI flows or stocks were initially non-
positive to capture the separate effects of BITs on the intensive (ܫܯ) and extensive (ܧܯ) 
margins of FDI. We do this through two additional variables, namely: 
∆ ln ܨܦܫ௜௝௧ூெ ൌ ൜
ሺln ܵܣܨܦܫ௜௝௧ሻ െ ሺln ܲܣܨܦܫ௜௝௧ሻ if	ܲܣܨܦܫ௜௝௧ ൐ 0
0 if	ܲܣܨܦܫ௜௝௧ ൑ 0 
∆ ln ܨܦܫ௜௝௧ாெ ൌ ൜
ሺln ܵܣܨܦܫ௜௝௧ሻ െ 0 if	ܲܣܨܦܫ௜௝௧ ൑ 0
0 if	ܲܣܨܦܫ௜௝௧ ൐ 0 
Given that we use linear estimators in our regression analysis and given that each country-pair 
lies at either the intensive or extensive margin (i.e. ∆ ln ܨܦܫ௜௝௧ ൌ ∆ ln ܨܦܫ௜௝௧ூெ ൅ ∆ ln ܨܦܫ௜௝௧ாெ), we 
can separate the overall effect of BIT formation into an effect that works along the intensive 
margin and one that works along the extensive margin. 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for our dependent and explanatory variables based upon the 
final dataset used for the difference-in-difference analysis. The continuous explanatory variables 
are the averages of the five years prior to the year of interest. The mean values of the FDI 
variables indicate a general tendency for the change in FDI flows and stocks between two five 
year periods to be positive. Since these are differences in logged averages, we can state that on 
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average FDI flows showed an increase between two five-year periods of 79.3%, with the average 
change for FDI stocks being 101.7%. Interestingly, we observe an average change in the 
intensive margin for FDI flows that is negative (-11.7%), with that in the case of FDI stocks 
being positive, but small (0.3%), suggesting that much of the increase in FDI flows and stocks 
has occurred along the extensive margin.  
Table 3 further includes information on discrete variables, such as the number of observations 
for which we observe a movement along the extensive margin (i.e. FDI births, ܨܦܫ௝,஻ூோ்ு, ݆ ൌ ܨ, ܵ) 
and the number for which we observe the death of an FDI relationship (ܨܦܫ௝,஽ா஺்ு	݆ ൌ ܨ, ܵ). The 
Table indicates that 12% (11%) of observations had a shift from zero to positive FDI flows 
(stocks) in the sample period, with 3% (1.5%) seeing a shift from positive to zero flows (stocks). 
In 2.5% of observations a new BIT was formed during the sample period. 
 
  
21 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ܲܣܨܦܫி  32,275 14,659.6 179,494.9 0.6 871,5401.0 
ܵܣܨܦܫி  32,275 30,002.4 282,634.4 0.6 9,602,991.0 
ܲܣܨܦܫௌ  32,275 127,760.7 1,388,279.0 1.0 60,600,000.0 
ܵܣܨܦܫௌ  32,275 262,131.7 2,611,473.0 1.0 96,500,000.0 
∆ lnܨܦܫி  32,275 0.793 3.028 -13.524 15.149 
∆ lnܨܦܫி,ூெ  32,275 -0.117 1.452 -13.524 10.069 
∆ lnܨܦܫி,ாெ  32,275 0.910 2.616 -0.511 15.149 
∆ lnܨܦܫௌ  32,275 1.017 3.214 -17.799 16.600 
∆ lnܨܦܫௌ,ூெ  32,275 0.003 1.229 -17.799 11.067 
∆ lnܨܦܫௌ,ாெ  32,275 1.014 2.971 0.000 16.600 
ln൫ܩܦ ௜ܲ ൅ ܩܦ ௝ܲ൯  31,462 26.820 1.329 22.112 30.282 
ܩܦܲݏ݅݉௜௝  31,462 -4.069 1.856 -11.189 -1.386 
ln ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝  32,289 8.770 0.659 4.088 9.850 
ܭ௜/൫ܭ௜ ൅ ܭ௝൯  32,289 0.737 0.352 0 1.000 
ܱܲܮܥܱ ௝ܰ  32,289 0.184 0.196 0 0.687 
Variable Observations Frequency 
Percentage 
(%)   
ܨܦܫி,஻ூோ்ு  32,275 3,915 12.1   
ܨܦܫி,஽ா஺்ு  32,275 983 3.0   
ܨܦܫௌ,஻ூோ்ு  32,275 3,662 11.3   
ܨܦܫௌ,஽ா஺்ு  32,275 479 1.5   
ܲܶܣ௜௝  32,289 1,701 5.3 
ܰ݁ݓܤܫ ௜ܶ௝  32,338 805 2.5 
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅ ௜݃௝  32,289 100 0.3 
ܥ݋݈݉ܽ݊ ௜݃௝  32,289 3,853 11.9 
ܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௜௝  32,289 807 2.5 
Notes: Descriptive statistics are based upon the final data used for the difference-in-difference 
analysis. ܲܣܨܦܫ and ܵܣܨܦܫ are reported in thousands of US$. Superscript ܨ(ܵ) refers to FDI 
Flows (Stocks), with ܫܯ(ܧܯ) referring to the intensive (extensive) margin, and ܤܫܴܶܪ (ܦܧܣܶܪ) 
referring the birth (death) of FDI relationships between time periods.  
 
Table 4 reports the mean (and standard deviation) of our different FDI flow and stock variables 
for all observations, and separately for country-pairs that formed BITs and those that did not. 
Also reported is the difference in mean values between BIT and non-BIT country-pairs and 
results of a simple t-test for significant differences between the two means. The mean values 
(and standard deviations) of all variables in the Table are larger for new BIT pairs than for non-
BIT pairs. While these differences are significant overall and for the extensive margin for FDI 
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flows, they are not significantly different in the case of the intensive margin. In the case of FDI 
stocks we observe that all differences are highly significant.   
Table 4: Comparison of BIT and non-BIT Country-Pairs 
 All NewBIT = 0 NewBIT = 1 Difference t-test(p-value) 
∆ lnܨܦܫி  0.793 (0.017) 
0.762
(0.017) 
1.999
(0.156) 1.237 0.000*** 
∆ lnܨܦܫி,ூெ  -0.117 (0.052) 
-0.119
(0.008) 
-0.047
(0.081) 0.073 0.163 
∆݈݊ܨܦܫி,ாெ  0.910 (0.015) 
0.881
(0.015) 
2.045
(0.133) 1.164 0.000*** 
∆ lnܨܦܫௌ  1.017 (0.018) 
0.981
(0.018) 
2.438
(0.153) 1.457 0.000*** 
∆ lnܨܦܫௌ,ூெ  0.003 (0.007) 
-0.002
(0.007) 
0.219
(0.049) 0.221 0.000*** 
∆ܨܦܫௌ,ாெ  1.014 (0.017) 
0.983
(0.016) 
2.219
(0.149) 1.236 0.000*** 
Notes: This table reports the mean value of (changes in) the FDI variables (with standard errors in brackets) for all 
observations, for non-BIT country-pairs and for new BIT country-pairs. Also reported is the difference in the mean 
between new and non-BIT members and the p-value of a simple t-test of significant differences in these variables 
between new and non-BIT pairs. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 report our main difference-in-difference estimates of the effects of BITs on FDI 
flows and stocks respectively. Results are reported for changes in FDI for all observations, and 
decomposed into the intensive and extensive margins, for the ATT, ATE and ATU. The upper 
part of the table reports results using the unmatched data with the lower part reporting results 
when using the matched data. In the case of the unmatched sample, results are reported when 
excluding and including year fixed effects, and when including the additional control variables 
(i.e. the set of explanatory variables described above and the variables used to control for 
multilateral resistance).27  
The results for the unmatched sample in Table 5 are similar to those reported in Table 1. They 
suggest an increase in FDI flows following BIT formation of between 96% and 253%, with the 
significant effects of BIT formation working along the extensive margin. Coefficients on the BIT 
                                                            
27 Note, that the differencing procedure will remove the country-pair fixed effects, so these are not controlled for in 
any of the specifications.  
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dummy at the intensive margin tend to be positive, but small and not significant, while at the 
extensive margin we find coefficients that are large, positive and significant. 
Turning to the matching results, we observe an ATT28 of between 0.348 and 1.091 when looking 
at all FDI flows, with the lower estimate being insignificant. These estimates suggest an increase 
in FDI flows due to BIT membership of between 41% and 198%. The mean estimate of the 
ATT is around 0.70, which is similar to the smallest estimate using the unmatched sample, and 
suggests an increase in FDI flows of around 102%. The ATT along the intensive margin is found 
to be small, insignificant, and occasionally negative. Along the extensive margin however, we 
find an ATT that is positive and significant across all the different matching estimators.  
The results for FDI stocks in Table 6 are broadly similar, with the estimated effects of BIT 
formation being to increase FDI stocks by between 109% and 330% for the full unmatched 
sample of observations. When looking at results along the intensive and extensive margins, we 
find coefficients on the BIT dummy that are positive and significant along both dimensions, 
though the coefficients tend to be considerably larger in the case of the extensive margin. For the 
intensive margin we find estimated average increases of between 14% and 25%. When using the 
matched sample, we find an estimated ATT of between 0.21 and 1.29, implying an increase in 
FDI stocks due to BIT formation of between 23% and 262%. The mean value of the estimates is 
similar to the lower estimates from the unmatched sample, and suggests an increase in FDI 
stocks of around 109% following BIT formation. We find a significant ATT in four cases for 
both the intensive and extensive margins, with the estimated effects being larger at the extensive 
margin in each case.   
In general, the results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that not matching leads to inflated estimates of 
the effect of BITs on FDI, with the lower (upper) unmatched estimate being 94% (16%) higher 
                                                            
28 For completeness we also report the estimated the average treatment effect (ATE) and the hypothetical treatment 
effect on the sample of non-treated individuals (ATU). Standard errors in these two cases are bootstrapped. For 
reasons of brevity we concentrate on the ATT in our discussion of the results. 
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than the lower (upper) estimate when matching in the case of FDI flows. For FDI stocks, the 
lower (upper) unmatched estimate is around 251% (13%) higher. Not controlling for self-
selection appears to overestimate the effects of BIT formation on FDI flows and stocks.29  
These results further suggest that the extensive margin is important in the effects of BIT 
formation on FDI flows and stocks. Indeed we find no significant increase in FDI flows for 
those country-pairs for which FDI flows were already positive in the period prior to BIT 
formation. For FDI stocks we find that BIT formation works along both margins, with the 
estimated effects at the extensive margin tending to be larger, however. Converting these effects 
into estimated quantities is complicated here, because the usual proportional or percentage 
change interpretation cannot be directly applied at the extensive margin whose base value (i.e. 
pre-treatment FDI flow or stock) is zero by definition. However, when we recognise that the 
treatment effects are capturing changes in the FDI flows and stocks of the treated relative to the 
untreated in the post-BIT-formation period, and we observe that even the untreated country 
pairs on the extensive margin had positive FDI flows and stocks on average in this period, we 
see that the post-treatment-period averages for the untreated country pairs gives us a valid base 
to work from. If our matching has been valid, this is what the average FDI flows and stocks of 
the treated country pairs would have been had they not been treated.  
Following this approach (see Appendix B for fuller details), our estimated average change in FDI 
(flows or stocks) due to BIT formation at the extensive margin is given by 
ሾ݁ߚ෡ܤܫܶ െ 1ሿܵܣܨܦܫܧܯሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ 
                                                            
29 The matching results also show a tendency to be larger for radius and kernel matching than for nearest neighbour 
and five nearest neighbour matching. The former two weighting mechanisms involve using more untreated country-
pairs as matches than the latter two, The nearest neighbour weighting, for example, simply uses the single country-
pair with a value of the propensity score closest to the treated country-pair, while the kernel method uses all non-
treated country-pairs as a match, albeit with smaller weights for more distant country-pairs. This use of more distant 
matches may help explain why the ATTs tend to be more similar to the unmatched results when using radius and 
kernel matching.  
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where ߚመ஻ூ் is the coefficient on the BIT dummy in the case of the unmatched sample and the 
estimated ATT in the case of matching, and ܵܣܨܦܫாெሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ is the average value of the 
FDI (stocks or flows) for the untreated country pairs at the extensive margin in the post-
treatment period. The corresponding formula for the estimates at the intensive margin involves 
an adjustment because, unlike the extensive margin, at the intensive margin the treated and 
untreated country pairs had different averages in the pre-treatment period. Our estimated 
average change in FDI (flow or stock) due to BIT formation at the intensive margin is   
ሾ݁ߚ෡ܤܫܶ െ 1ሿ ൝ܲܣܨܦܫ
ܫܯሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ
ܲܣܨܦܫܫܯሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ ൈ ܵܣܨܦܫ
ܫܯሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻൡ 
where ܲܣܨܦܫூெሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ and ܲܣܨܦܫூெሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ are the average values of FDI flows or 
stocks in the pre-treatment period for untreated and treated country pairs at the intensive margin 
respectively. The second term in this expression estimates what the average FDI (flow or stock) 
of the treated would have been in the post-treatment period, had they not been treated.  
Applying these formulae30 to FDI flows we find, for the unmatched sample, estimated effects of 
BIT formation on the intensive margin ranging from $5.9 million to $7.3 million, while those 
along the extensive margin range from $3.5 million to $9.8 million. For the matched sample the 
numbers are smaller, ranging from of $-2.6 million to $6.6 million along the intensive margin and 
$1.9 million to $7.9 million along the extensive margin. Although these estimated effects at the 
two margins are of similar orders of magnitude, recall that the estimated coefficients at the 
intensive margin are not statistically significant. Turning to FDI stocks, we would expect the 
estimated short-run (five year) changes at the extensive margin to be much smaller than those at 
the intensive margin simply because of the large difference in the average stocks at the two 
margins in the pre-treatment period. This expectation is confirmed.  In the matched sample, for 
example, we find estimated effects along the intensive margin between $50.4 million and $188 
                                                            
30 Details of the following calculations are provided in Appendix Table A2.  
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million, while the range along the extensive margin is only $2.2 million to $29 million. Similar 
results are found when using the unmatched sample, though the estimated effects tend to be 
considerably larger.  
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Table 5: Difference-in-Difference Results for FDI Flows 
 ∆ lnܨܦܫி ∆ ln ܨܦܫி,ூெ ∆ lnܨܦܫி,ாெ
          
Unmatched 1.237*** 1.262*** 0.674*** 0.0726 0.0857 0.0904 1.164*** 1.177*** 0.584*** 
 (0.157) (0.156) (0.157) (0.0802) (0.0799) (0.0819) (0.133) (0.133) (0.134) 
          
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
          
 ATT ATU ATE ATT ATU ATE ATT ATU ATE 
 
Mahalanobis Distance Metric (Bias Adjusted) 
One to One Matching 0.3479 
(0.2181) 
0.1895* 
(0.1039) 
0.1876 
(0.1435) 
-0.0034 
(0.1115) 
-0.0769 
(0.1033) 
-0.0716 
(0.0545) 
0.3513* 
(0.1853) 
0.2664*** 
(0.1027) 
0.2592** 
(0.1072) 
Five Nearest Neighbour Matching 0.4926*** 
(0.1750) 
0.3656*** 
(0.1164) 
0.3641*** 
(0.1155) 
0.0811 
(0.0902) 
-0.0479 
(0.0832) 
-0.0455 
(0.0565) 
0.4114*** 
(0.1482) 
0.4134*** 
(0.1331) 
0.4096*** 
(0.0841) 
          
Propensity Score Metric    
One to One Matching 0.6443*** 
(0.2135) 
0.5897** 
(0.2380) 
0.5911*** 
(0.1824) 
-0.0338 
(0.1108) 
-0.0808 
(0.0813) 
-0.0796 
(0.0891) 
0.6781*** 
(0.1787) 
0.6704*** 
(0.1620) 
0.6707*** 
(0.1924) 
Five Nearest Neighbour Matching 0.7134*** 
(0.1700) 
0.4780*** 
(0.1395) 
0.4841** 
(0.2347) 
0.0089 
(0.0892) 
-0.1218 
(0.2287) 
-0.1185 
(0.0818) 
0.7045*** 
(0.1445) 
0.5998*** 
(0.1417) 
0.6025*** 
(0.1985) 
Radius Matching (radius = 0.01) 1.0909*** 
(0.1585) 
1.1033*** 
(0.1654) 
1.1030*** 
(0.1480) 
0.0648 
(0.0822) 
-0.0241 
(0.0815) 
-0.0218 
(0.0661) 
1.0261*** 
(0.1343) 
1.1274*** 
(0.1068) 
1.1248*** 
(0.1364) 
Kernel Matching (Epanechnikov kernel, 
bandwidth = 0.06) 
0.9273*** 
(0.1589) 
0.8855*** 
(0.1304) 
0.8865*** 
(0.1516) 
0.0622 
(0.0824) 
-0.0809 
(0.0868) 
-0.0772 
(0.0683) 
0.8650*** 
(0.1347) 
0.9664*** 
(0.1281) 
0.9637*** 
(0.1522) 
          
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The top half of this table reports the coefficient on a BIT dummy from a difference-in-difference 
regression. The lower half of the table reports various treatment effects from BIT membership on North-South FDI flows. ATT, ATU and ATE refer to the Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated, the Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated and the Average Treatment Effect respectively. Standard errors for the ATU and ATE are bootstrapped.
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Table 6: Difference-in-Difference Results for FDI Stocks 
 ∆ lnܨܦܫௌ ∆ ln ܨܦܫௌ,ூெ ∆ lnܨܦܫௌ,ாெ
          
Unmatched 1.457*** 1.433*** 0.738*** 0.221*** 0.224*** 0.139*** 1.236*** 1.208*** 0.599*** 
 (0.153) (0.153) (0.151) (0.0494) (0.0498) (0.0534) (0.149) (0.148) (0.148) 
          
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
          
 ATT ATU ATE ATT ATU ATE ATT ATU ATE 
 
Mahalanobis Distance Metric (Bias Adjusted) 
One to One Matching 0.2105 
 (0.2220) 
0.4179** 
(0.2046) 
0.4101*** 
(0.1182) 
0.0766 
(0.0733) 
-0.0665 
(0.0453) 
-0.0630 
(0.0530) 
0.1339 
(0.2143) 
0.4843*** 
(0.1761) 
0.4731*** 
(0.1487) 
Five Nearest Neighbour Matching 0.3273** 
(0.1731) 
0.6789*** 
(0.2042) 
0.6679*** 
(0.1289) 
0.0671 
(0.0573) 
0.0380 
(0.0335) 
0.0389 
(0.0728) 
0.2603 
(0.1677) 
0.6409*** 
(0.2622) 
0.6291*** 
(0.1936) 
          
Propensity Score Metric    
One to One Matching 0.7630*** 
(0.2163) 
0.3467 
(0.2625) 
0.3575 
(0.2501) 
0.2298*** 
(0.0789) 
-0.1778 
(0.1606) 
-0.1668 
(0.1397) 
0.5332*** 
(0.2055) 
0.5240*** 
(0.1969) 
0.5242** 
(0.2466) 
Five Nearest Neighbour Matching 0.7837*** 
(0.1684) 
0.3264* 
(0.1886) 
0.3382 
(0.2223) 
0.1628*** 
(0.0579) 
-0.1908* 
(0.0977) 
-0.1816 
(0.1478) 
0.6209*** 
(0.1638) 
0.5172*** 
(0.1795) 
0.5198*** 
(0.1505) 
Radius Matching (radius = 0.01) 1.2871*** 
(0.1548) 
1.2313*** 
(0.1687) 
1.2327*** 
(0.1418) 
0.2087*** 
(0.0504) 
0.1656** 
(0.0669) 
0.1667*** 
(0.0440) 
1.0784*** 
(0.1505) 
1.0658*** 
(0.1460) 
1.0661*** 
(0.1083) 
Kernel Matching (Epanechnikov kernel, 
bandwidth = 0.06) 
1.0499*** 
(0.1552) 
0.9857*** 
(0.1152) 
0.9873*** 
(0.1458) 
0.1720*** 
(0.0507) 
0.0805 
(0.0479) 
0.0829 
(0.0635) 
0.8779*** 
(0.1509) 
0.9052*** 
(0.1384) 
0.9045*** 
(0.2002) 
          
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The top half of this table reports the coefficient on a BIT dummy from a difference-in-difference 
regression. The lower half of the table reports various treatment effects from BIT membership on North-South FDI flows. ATT, ATU and ATE refer to the Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated, the Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated and the Average Treatment Effect respectively. Standard errors for the ATU and ATE are bootstrapped.
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5. Heterogeneous Effects of BITs 
Apart from distinguishing between the intensive and extensive margins, our approach so far has 
imposed the condition that the effects of BIT formation on FDI stocks and flows are the same 
across country-pairs. But in general we may expect that these effects will depend on the same 
explanatory variables as determine the FDI flows and stocks themselves. In particular, based on 
the literature we anticipate a heterogeneous impact of BITs depending on policy stability in the 
host, with existing evidence suggesting that BITs and institutions could be substitutes or 
complements. Increasingly PTAs include provisions related to FDI, so it is also of interest to 
examine whether there are differences in the effects of BITs on FDI flows and stocks if country-
pairs already have a PTA in force.  
Wooldridge (2002) discusses a regression based approach that allows for interactions of the 
treatment variable and explanatory variables that can be extended to our matched difference-in-
difference setting. This approach involves regressing the measure of FDI on the treatment status 
variable (i.e. the BIT dummy), the set of explanatory variables and the demeaned explanatory 
variables interacted with the treatment dummy. In adopting this approach, we begin by matching 
using the propensity score and then estimate the treatment effects using weighted least squares 
(WLS), including in the WLS regression our set of explanatory variables and the demeaned 
explanatory variables interacted with the treatment dummy. Table 7 (8) reports results for the 
FDI flows (stocks), for all observations and separately for the intensive and extensive margins. 
In our discussion, we concentrate on the sign and significance of the coefficients on the 
interactions to give some indication on the extent and direction of any heterogeneity.  
Since we have no reason a priori to expect the interaction effects for flows and stocks to differ in 
sign and significance, our main interest is in results that are robust across both flows and stocks 
and a range of matching methods. The positive and significant coefficients on combined market 
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size and GDP similarity appear to meet this criterion. Larger and more similar sized markets also 
appear to strengthen the effects of BITs at both the intensive and extensive margins. Otherwise, 
there is some evidence (from the stock equations at least) that increased distance reduces a BITs 
effectiveness, while a common language increases it. The stock equation also suggests that a 
former colonial relationship may reduce the effectiveness of a BIT, primarily through the 
extensive margin. The coefficients on the common border interaction are sometimes significant, 
but their signs offer no consistent pattern. Of the two variables mentioned at the start of this 
section, we find no robust evidence that an existing PTA affects the impact of a new BIT, and 
slight evidence that policy constraints are complementary to BIT formation. This suggestion of 
complementarity between BITs and domestic institutions is consistent with the other work using 
bilateral FDI data reviewed earlier,  
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Table 7: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of BIT Membership on FDI Flows 
 ∆ lnܨܦܫி ∆ lnܨܦܫி,ூெ ∆ ln ܨܦܫி,ாெ
 NN 5NN Radius Kernel NN 5NN Radius Kernel NN 5NN Radius Kernel 
Main effect of new BIT 0.332* 0.290 0.434*** 0.381** -0.173* -0.0923 -0.171** -0.127 0.504*** 0.382** 0.606*** 0.508*** 
 (0.183) (0.188) (0.157) (0.165) (0.0889) (0.0955) (0.0827) (0.0855) (0.159) (0.157) (0.132) (0.137) 
             
Interaction terms with:             
lnܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝  0.315 -0.170 -0.298 -0.289 0.0802 0.0186 -0.118 -0.111 0.234 -0.189 -0.180 -0.178 
 (0.200) (0.201) (0.252) (0.226) (0.0969) (0.102) (0.133) (0.117) (0.173) (0.168) (0.212) (0.189) 
ln൫ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ܩܦ ௝ܲ௧൯  0.822*** 0.730*** 0.269* 0.478*** 0.248*** 0.102 0.127* 0.0930 0.574*** 0.627*** 0.142 0.385*** 
 (0.130) (0.132) (0.142) (0.137) (0.0628) (0.0671) (0.0750) (0.0713) (0.112) (0.110) (0.119) (0.115) 
ܩܦܲݏ݅݉௜௝௧  0.443*** 0.395*** 0.0672 0.230** 0.143*** 0.0667 0.113** 0.106** 0.301*** 0.329*** -0.0458 0.125 
 (0.102) (0.103) (0.105) (0.102) (0.0492) (0.0521) (0.0551) (0.0531) (0.0879) (0.0858) (0.0878) (0.0854) 
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝  5.353*** 3.993** 1.587 2.965 0.397 0.518 0.439 0.720 4.956*** 3.476*** 1.148 2.245 
 (1.381) (1.580) (2.455) (1.868) (0.669) (0.804) (1.294) (0.970) (1.195) (1.322) (2.061) (1.559) 
ܥ݋݈݉ܽ݊݃௜௝  1.026 0.712 0.865 0.605 0.637** 0.236 0.0102 -0.0425 0.389 0.475 0.855* 0.647 
 (0.642) (0.655) (0.545) (0.579) (0.311) (0.333) (0.287) (0.300) (0.555) (0.548) (0.458) (0.483) 
ܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௜௝  -0.994 -0.757 -0.251 -0.815 -0.156 -0.0859 0.668 0.479 -0.838 -0.671 -0.919 -1.293* 
 (0.809) (0.775) (0.939) (0.847) (0.392) (0.394) (0.495) (0.439) (0.700) (0.649) (0.788) (0.707) 
ܭ௜௧/൫ܭ௜௧ ൅ ܭ௝௧൯  0.321 0.676 -0.258 -0.0562 -0.182 -0.229 -0.111 -0.0834 0.503 0.905** -0.147 0.0272 
 (0.490) (0.483) (0.479) (0.488) (0.237) (0.246) (0.252) (0.254) (0.424) (0.404) (0.402) (0.408) 
ܱܲܮܥܱ ௝ܰ௧  1.662** 1.734** 1.193 0.901 -0.263 0.152 0.128 -0.0966 1.924*** 1.581*** 1.064 0.998 
 (0.725) (0.724) (0.837) (0.813) (0.351) (0.368) (0.441) (0.422) (0.627) (0.606) (0.703) (0.679) 
ܲܶܣ௜௝௧  0.842* 0.267 0.251 0.194 -0.0478 -0.121 -0.149 -0.380 0.890** 0.388 0.400 0.573 
 (0.510) (0.499) (0.692) (0.611) (0.247) (0.254) (0.365) (0.317) (0.442) (0.418) (0.581) (0.510) 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; NN and 5N refer to nearest neighbour and five nearest neighbour matching respectively. 
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Table 8: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of BIT Membership on FDI Stocks 
 ∆ lnܨܦܫௌ ∆ lnܨܦܫௌ,ூெ ∆ ln ܨܦܫௌ,ாெ
 NN 5NN Radius Kernel NN 5NN Radius Kernel NN 5NN Radius Kernel 
Main effect of new BIT 0.00142 0.0218 0.186 0.170 -0.111 -0.182** -0.175*** -0.164*** 0.112 0.204 0.362*** 0.334** 
 (0.176) (0.177) (0.143) (0.152) (0.0800) (0.0802) (0.0490) (0.0562) (0.162) (0.165) (0.140) (0.146) 
             
Interaction terms with:             
lnܦ݅ݏݐ௜௝  -0.196 -0.741*** -0.432* -0.380* 0.00215 -0.108 -0.111 -0.146* -0.198 -0.633*** -0.321 -0.233 
 (0.192) (0.190) (0.230) (0.209) (0.0872) (0.0860) (0.0787) (0.0772) (0.177) (0.177) (0.225) (0.200) 
ln൫ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ܩܦ ௝ܲ௧൯  1.242*** 1.259*** 0.919*** 1.094*** 0.318*** 0.344*** 0.287*** 0.295*** 0.924*** 0.915*** 0.632*** 0.798*** 
 (0.124) (0.125) (0.130) (0.127) (0.0565) (0.0563) (0.0444) (0.0469) (0.114) (0.116) (0.127) (0.122) 
ܩܦܲݏ݅݉௜௝௧  0.547*** 0.612*** 0.290*** 0.404*** 0.225*** 0.236*** 0.161*** 0.177*** 0.323*** 0.376*** 0.129 0.227** 
 (0.0975) (0.0968) (0.0953) (0.0944) (0.0443) (0.0438) (0.0327) (0.0350) (0.0898) (0.0899) (0.0934) (0.0907) 
ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃௜௝  -2.890** -0.0469 -1.107 -0.830 1.767*** 1.048 1.049 1.399** -4.657*** -1.095 -2.156 -2.229 
 (1.324) (1.492) (2.237) (1.723) (0.602) (0.675) (0.767) (0.638) (1.220) (1.386) (2.192) (1.655) 
ܥ݋݈݉ܽ݊݃௜௝  1.389** 2.231*** 1.152** 1.479*** 0.566** 0.416 0.0795 0.170 0.823 1.815*** 1.073** 1.309** 
 (0.616) (0.619) (0.497) (0.534) (0.280) (0.280) (0.170) (0.198) (0.567) (0.574) (0.487) (0.513) 
ܥ݋݈݋݊ݕ௜௝  -0.852 -2.263*** -0.929 -1.496* -0.530 -0.491 -0.121 -0.142 -0.323 -1.772*** -0.808 -1.354* 
 (0.776) (0.732) (0.856) (0.781) (0.353) (0.331) (0.293) (0.289) (0.715) (0.680) (0.838) (0.750) 
ܭ௜௧/൫ܭ௜௧ ൅ ܭ௝௧൯  1.668*** 1.170** 0.305 0.757* -0.321 -0.415** -0.0925 -0.0835 1.989*** 1.585*** 0.397 0.841* 
 (0.470) (0.456) (0.436) (0.450) (0.214) (0.206) (0.150) (0.167) (0.433) (0.424) (0.428) (0.433) 
ܱܲܮܥܱ ௝ܰ௧  -0.260 -0.202 -0.0371 -0.0671 0.728** 0.510* 0.305 0.278 -0.987 -0.712 -0.342 -0.345 
 (0.695) (0.684) (0.763) (0.750) (0.316) (0.309) (0.261) (0.278) (0.641) (0.635) (0.748) (0.720) 
ܲܶܣ௜௝௧  -0.140 -0.558 0.444 0.370 -0.0790 -0.270 0.0280 0.101 -0.0614 -0.288 0.416 0.269 
 (0.489) (0.472) (0.631) (0.564) (0.223) (0.213) (0.216) (0.209) (0.451) (0.438) (0.618) (0.542) 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; NN and 5N refer to nearest neighbour and five nearest neighbour matching respectively. 
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6. Conclusions  
This paper uses a matched difference-in-difference methodology to estimate the causal effects of 
BIT formation on FDI flows and stocks from OECD source countries to a large sample of host 
countries. We find that BIT formation has a positive and significant impact on FDI flows and 
stocks, with the estimated effects found to be substantially lower after controlling for self-
selection through matching. Our mean estimates suggest an approximate doubling of bilateral 
FDI flows and stocks after BIT formation, though there is considerable variation in estimates 
across matching methods. The development of new FDI relationships was found to be an 
important component of these effects. Indeed, for FDI flows BIT formation only had a 
statistically significant effect at the extensive margin. For FDI stocks, the effects for existing FDI 
relationships were estimated to be quantitatively much larger.  
There is some evidence that the effects of BIT formation are heterogeneous, depending on 
combined market size and similarity in particular. The effects may be smaller for country-pairs 
that are more distant, or have a prior colonial relationship, and may be larger for country-pairs 
that share a common language. While an existing PTA may have a positive impact on FDI flows 
and stocks and the probability that two countries sign a BIT, we find little evidence that an 
existing PTA makes a new BIT more effective. The suggestion that institutional quality might be 
complementary to BIT formation was consistent with existing results, and does not provide 
support for the view that BITs can act as an alternative to appropriate domestic institutions for 
protecting the rights of foreign investors. 
In terms of future work, the inclusion of investment provisions in recent attempts at deep trade 
agreements among advanced nations, suggests a similar examination of the effects of BIT 
agreements on North-North investment might be useful. Likewise, before we use our and 
others’ results to proclaim the ‘FDI creating’ benefits of BITs it would be useful to know the 
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extent to which these estimates of the effects of BIT formation in promoting bilateral FDI 
actually represent ‘FDI diversion’. It is not unlikely that at least some of this FDI would 
otherwise have gone to third parties.   
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Appendix A: Country Sample 
The North (reporter countries) are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the United States of 
America. 
 
The South (recipient countries) are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Krygzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Macao, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic 
of the Congo, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia. 
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Appendix B: Estimating the Quantitative Effects of BITs along the Intensive and 
Extensive Margins 
In this appendix, we explain how we calculate comparable estimated quantitative effects of BIT 
formation on FDI flows and stocks along the intensive and extensive margins. As discussed in 
the main text, our problem arises because the values of FDI flows (stocks) along the extensive 
margin are zero by definition in the pre-BIT period (i.e. ܲܣܨܦܫ௜௝௧ ൌ 0), and hence cannot be 
used as a base to calculate the quantitative effects of BIT formation.  
Figure A1 is a graphical illustration of the standard difference-in-difference estimator. In the 
initial period (ݐ1), FDI for the treated and untreated groups are given by ܲܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ and 
ܲܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ respectively. Assuming a common trend, the outcomes in the second period 
(ݐ2) would be given by ܵܣܨܦܫ’ሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ and ܵܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ for the treated and untreated 
groups respectively, if the effect of the treatment was zero. In the case pictured, the actual value 
of FDI in period ݐ2 for the treated group is given by ܵܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ, with the distance 
ܵܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܵܣܨܦܫ’ሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ then representing the estimated treatment effect.  
 
Figure A1: Difference-In-Difference Estimates 
 
Using Figure A1, we can describe how we obtain our estimate of the quantitative impact of 
treatment along the intensive and extensive margins. In the case of the extensive margin, the 
value of FDI in period ݐ1 will be the same for the treated and untreated groups, i.e. 
ܲܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ܲܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ 0. The estimated treatment effect will therefore be:  
ܵܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܵܣܨܦܫ’ሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 	ܵܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܵܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ	
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Using the estimated coefficient on the BIT dummy in the unmatched case and the ATT in the 
case of matching (ߚመ஻ூ்) in the analysis above, we can write the quantitative impact of BIT 
formation on the extensive margin of FDI as: 
ܵܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܵܣܨܦܫ’ሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 	 ሾ݁ఉ෡ಳ಺೅ െ 1ሿܵܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ (A1) 
In the case of the intensive margin, ܲܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ will generally not be equal to 
ܲܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ, with ܲܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ differing from ܲܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ, by the factor: 
ܨ ൌ ܲܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻܲܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ 
In period ݐ2 therefore, we can use ܨ to obtain an estimate of ܵܣܨܦܫ’ሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ as: 
ܵܣܨܦܫ’ሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ܨ ൈ ܵܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻ   (A2) 
We can then use this information to calculate the quantitative impact of BIT formation on the 
intensive margin of FDI as: 
ܵܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ െ ܵܣܨܦܫ’ሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ 	 ሾ݁ఉ෡ಳ಺೅ െ 1ሿሺܨ ൈ ܵܣܨܦܫሺܤܫܶ ൌ 0ሻሻ 
Table A1 reports the average values of ܲܣܨܦܫ and ܵܣܨܦܫ for the treated and untreated groups. 
Based upon these data we can calculate ܵܣܨܦܫ’ሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻ in the case of the intensive margin 
for FDI flows and stocks as: 
ܵܣܨܦܫ′ሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻி஽ூ	ி௟௢௪௦ ൌ 45,168.2134,532 ൈ 232,447.4 ൌ 78,042.6 
ܵܣܨܦܫ′ሺܤܫܶ ൌ 1ሻி஽ூ	ௌ௧௢௖௞௦ ൌ 377,986.8996,154.5 ൈ 1,912,717 ൌ 725,772.7 
With this and information from Table A1, along with equations (A1) and (A2), and the estimated 
treatment effects in Tables 5 and 6 we calculate the range of estimated effects of BIT formation. 
These are reported in Table A2.  
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Table A1: Mean Values of ܵܣܨܦܫ and ܲܣܨܦܫ by Group 
  
Extensive Margin 
݈݊ܲܣܨܦܫ ൌ 0  
Intensive Margin 
݈݊ܲܣܨܦܫ ് 0 
BIT Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
FDI Flows 
PAFDI 1 547 1 0 253 45,168.19 134,344.1 
PAFDI 0 28056 1 0 3433 134,532 534,247.8 
SAFDI 1 546 13,190.98 65,779.6 256 121,417.8 311,447.3 
SAFDI 0 28050 4,427.292 65,710.02 3469 232,447.4 808,542.8 
FDI Stocks 
PAFDI 1 579 1 0 221 377,986.8 1,064,802 
PAFDI 0 27433 1 0 4056 996,154.5 3,795,748 
SAFDI 1 578 42,537.69 247,554.8 224 868,817.1 2,112,215 
SAFDI 0 27427 15,161.51 206,181.7 4092 191,2717 7,078,451 
Notes: This table reports the mean and standard deviation of ܲܣܨܦܫ and ܵܣܨܦܫ (in thousands of US dollars) along 
the extensive and intensive margin for the treated and untreated groups separately.  
 
Table A2: Range of Estimated Effects of BITs along the Extensive and Intensive Margin 
 Sample Range of Coefficients Lower Estimate Upper Estimate 
FDI Flows     
Extensive 
Margin 
Unmatched 0.584 – 1.164 ቀ4,427.29 ൈ ሺ݁଴.ହ଼ସ െ 1ሻቁ ൈ 1,000 ൌ $3,511,713
൫4,427.29 ൈ ሺ݁ଵ.ଵ଺ସ െ 1ሻ൯ ൈ 1,000 
ൌ $9,752,074 
Matched 0.3513 – 1.0261 ቀ4,427.29 ൈ ሺ݁଴.ଷହଵଷ െ 1ሻቁ ൈ 1,000 ൌ $1,863,506
൫4,427.29 ൈ ሺ݁ଵ.଴ଶ଺ଵ െ 1ሻ൯ ൈ 1,000 
ൌ $7,925,571 
Intensive 
Margin 
Unmatched 0.0726 – 0.0904 ൫78,042.6 ൈ ሺ݁଴.଴଻ଶ଺ െ 1ሻ൯ ൈ 1,000 ൌ $5,876,664
൫78,042.6 ൈ ሺ݁଴.଴ଽ଴ସ െ 1ሻ൯ ൈ 1,000 
ൌ $7,383,770
Matched -0.0338 – 0.0811 ൫78,042.6 ൈ ሺ݁ି଴.଴ଷଷ଼ െ 1ሻ൯ ൈ 1,000 ൌ െ$2,593,758
൫78,042.6 ൈ ሺ݁଴.଴଼ଵଵ െ 1ሻ൯ ൈ 1,000 
ൌ $6,592,987
     
FDI Stocks     
Extensive 
Margin 
Unmatched 0.599 – 1.236 ሺ15,161.5 ൈ 0.599ሻ ൈ 1,000 ൌ $12,436,942
ሺ15,161.5 ൈ 1.236ሻ ൈ 1,000 
ൌ $37,021,633
Matched 0.1339 – 1.0784 ሺ15,161.5 ൈ 0.1339ሻ ൈ 1,000 ൌ $2,172,317
ሺ15,161.5 ൈ 1.0784ሻ ൈ 1,000 
ൌ $29,412,883
Intensive 
Margin 
Unmatched 0.139 – 0.224 ൫725,772.7 ൈ ሺ݁଴.ଵଷଽ െ 1ሻ൯ ൈ 1,000 ൌ $108,230,200
൫725,772.7 ൈ ሺ݁଴.ଶଶସ െ 1ሻ൯ ൈ 1,000 
ൌ $182,220,492
Matched 0.0671 – 0.2298 ሺ725,772.7 ൈ 0.0671ሻ ൈ 1,000 ൌ $50,370,377
ሺ725,772.7 ൈ 0.2298ሻ ൈ 1,000 
ൌ $187,502,154
Notes: This table reports the range of estimated quantitative effects of BIT formation on the intensive and extensive 
margin of FDI flows and stocks. Values are multiplied by 1,000 to express the effects in US$ rather than 1,000s of 
US$. 
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